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LAW, LEGALISM, AND COMMUNITY BEFORE 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
Bruce H. Mann* 
Community is an elusive concept, all the more so for being an evo-
cative one. It conjures images of a simpler time when relations were 
close and familial, when people mattered more than things, when 
neighbors truly did love one another as they loved themselves. This 
veil of romanticism lends special peril to the historical study of com-
munity. After all, as Randall Jarrell once wrote, the problem with 
golden ages is that the people who live in them complain that every-
thing looks yellow. 1 Idealized notions of community can lead histori-
ans to dismiss such complaints as churlish caviling in the face of 
obvious good fortune, or to pay them too much heed in irritated reac-
tion against aggressive naivete and good cheer. Both response8 are 
extreme, but they proceed naturally from typological theories of social 
change that posit polar dichotomies of status and contract, Gemein-
schaft and Gesellschaft, traditional and modern, Puritan and Yankee 
- to name but a few of the paired opposites that incautious acolytes 
interpret as mutually exclusive and probably successive. 2 The reality, 
of course, is more complex, as reality often is. The intricate webs of 
human interactions that underlie politics, economy, and society do not 
lend themselves to easy categorization. 
Historians, of all people, should be sensitive to such nuances. 
Themes of community have dominated the historiography of early 
America for the last twenty years, more particularly since 1970- the 
1848 of social history, when four path-breaking books changed the 
way colonial historians framed the questions they asked of the past. 3 
* Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis. A.B. 1972, A.M. 1972, Brown Uni-
versity; J.D. 1975, M. Phil. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Yale University. - Ed. 
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of 
American Historians on April 13, 1986, in New York. I am grateful to John M. Murrin, A.G. 
Roeber, and Peter N. Coclanis for their generous comments on the panel. 
1. Jarrell, The Appalling Taste of the Age, SAT. EVENING POST, July 26, 1958, at 18. 
2. See T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 15-25 (1978). 
3. J. DEMOS, A LITILE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY (1970); 
P. GREVEN, FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND FAMILY IN COLONIAL 
ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS (1970); K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS, 1636-1736 (1970) (2d ed. 1985); M. ZUCKER-
MAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
(1970). These four were not the first community studies. Earlier works include C. GRANT, 
DEMOCRACY IN THE CONNECTICUT FRONTIER TOWN OF KENT (1961); S. POWELL, PURITAN 
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Since then, detailed studies of individual towns have proliferated as 
the vehicle of choice for recovering the texture of daily life.4 Declen-
sion had already become the leitmotif of Puritan studies under the 
forceful pen of Perry Miller, so it was perhaps inevitable that commu-
nity studies would also find, and sometimes lament, the decline of 
community.5 They differed, however, on when the breakdown of com-
muility occurred. Candidates ranged from the antinomian contro-
versy in the 1630s to the Second Great Awakening in the early 1800s, 
with occasional votes for the later nineteenth or early twentieth centu-
ries. 6 The variety is understandable, since, as one historian recently 
remarked, "[n]o historian labors in the eye-straining, frustratingly in-
complete, and sometimes nearly intractable sources of local records in· 
order to prove the changelessness of the society he or she is study-
ing. "7 Moreover, the closer historians looked, the more they discov-
ered such apparent anomalies as Stephen Innes' proto-capitalistic 
Springfield, settled in the same year as Kenneth Lockridge's Christian, 
utopian, closed, corporate Dedham, or, heresy of heresies, Christine 
Heyrman's Gloucester and Marblehead, where the traditional indicia 
of community intensified rather than crumbled under the pressure of 
commercial develop'.fuent. 8 
Such discoveries are anomalous only if one ignores the essential 
pluralism of historical experience and instead assumes the universality 
and inexorability that are implicit in dichotomous typologies. Com-
munity need not necessarily "break down," nor need it always exist or 
consist of the same qualities. The best of the recent community studies 
caution against such assumptions. Legal historians, however, have not 
been as careful. There are, of course, exceptions. David Konig's 
study of Essex county, Massachusetts, and A.G. Roeber's work on 
Virginia, for example, display enormous sensitivity to the interactions 
VILLAGE: THE FORMATION OF A NEW ENGLAND TOWN (1963); D. RUTMAN, WINTHROP'S 
BOSTON: PORTRAIT OF A PURITAN TOWN, 1630-1649 (1965). But the methodologies of the 
1970 studies were the freshest and most distinctive, and the synergistic effect of their simultane-
ous appearance, particularly among young historians, was electrifying. See generally Murrin, 
Review Essay, 11 HIST. & THEORY 226 (1972). 
4. For the most recent attempt to evaluate the enterprise, see Rutman, Assessing the Little 
Communities of Early America, 43 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 163 (1986). 
5. Miller articulated the theme of declension most clearly in P. MILLER, THE NEW ENG-
LAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953). 
6. See T. BENDER, supra note 2, at 45-53; Nash, Social Development, in COLONIAL BRITISH 
AMERICA: EssAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 233, 236 (J. Greene & 
J. Pole eds. 1984). 
7. Nash, supra note 6, at 237. 
8. C. HEYRMAN, COMMERCE AND CULTURE: THE MARITIME COMMUNITIES OF COLO-
NIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1690-1750 (1984); S. INNES, LABOR IN A NEW LAND: ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SPRINGFIELD (1983); K. LOCKRIDGE, supra note 3. 
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between law and society.9 And the tradition of historical still lifes, 
which capture and freeze slices of a social and legal past but which do 
not attempt to deal with change, has continued since George Haskins 
made the genre respectable twenty-five years ago. 10 More often, 
though, the dominant view has been that of William Nelson and Mor-
ton Horwitz, whose works, for all their abundant merit, posit or as-
sume idealized, homogenized pictures of the colonial period that differ 
little from the casual dismissals by Roscoe Pound and Grant 
Gilmore.II 
The connections between law and community are difficult to iden-
tify, let alone explain. It may be best to begin by seeing how law and 
the ways people used it changed, and then attempt to relate those 
changes to the surrounding economy and society. One must, of 
course, be wary of finding what one looks for. Nonetheless, as with 
objects against a dark background, it is sometimes easier to see things 
when they move than when they remain still. To illustrate the interac-
tive nature of legal change and community, I will draw on examples 
from Connecticut before the Revolution - not because I think Con-
necticut was representative or typical, but because I know something 
about it. As it happens, there were significant changes in the legal sys-
tem from the end of the seventeenth century to the eve of the Revolu-
tion, both in the ways people used the legal system and in its internal 
characteristics. There were also perceptible changes in the economy 
and society of the colony during the same period. The juxtaposition 
may have been coincidental, but I think not. The changes were linked, 
however loosely, by the growth of a legalist paradigm, in which the 
formal legal system supplanted ways of dealing that were rooted in 
communities and became the standards for all forms of disputing. 
I 
The principal changes in the legal system during the eighteenth 
century were not changes in substantive law. Instead, they were 
changes in how people structured their legal relations, such as a shift 
in the way they evidenced debt obligations, and changes in how they 
9. D. KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: EssEX COUNTY, 1629-
1692 (1979); A. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS 
OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810 (1981). 
10. G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRAD!· 
TION AND DESIGN (1960). 
11. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMA· 
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN 
LAW (1938); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). 
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litigated their disputes, in particular an increase in the technicality of 
pleadings and a decline in the use of juries in civil actions. 
A shift in the legal framework of relations between debtors and 
creditors may seem unimportant until one notes that debt cases ac-
counted for ninety percent of all civil actions in the eighteenth cen-
tury.12 In a society that had little hard currency and where income 
was tied to the vagaries of harvests and the sea, credit was essential. 
Until shortly after the turn of the century, book accounts were the 
preferred means of extending credit, whether the debt was that of a 
farmer to his hay mower, a townsman to a shopkeeper, or a merchant 
to his factor. By the 1730s, a scant generation later, book accounts 
had fallen from favor and been replaced by formal credit instruments 
- bonds, bills obligatory, and, primarily, promissory notes - as the 
debt obligation of choice.13 There were no substantive or procedural 
changes that would explain the declining popularity of book debt and 
the concomitant rise of written credit instruments, yet the shift is 
unmistakable. 
The key to explaining the change lies in the nature of the debt 
obligations themselves. Book accounts, as the name implies, were ac-
count books in which the creditor entered a continuous record of his 
transactions with his debtors. Anyone could keep a book, and it may 
be that most men did at one time or another in the course of trading 
goods or services. Book accounts had an almost organic quality, 
which nicely mirrored the economic relations they recorded. The 
debtor's account grew, one transaction at a time, perhaps reduced by 
occasional payments or seasonal settlements, until the creditor saw fit 
to request full payment. Some books were short, others long. Some 
spanned months, others years. There were no limits to the number or 
duration of transactions except those set by the parties as they contin-
ued to deal with one another, nor did book accounts contain an ex-
press promise by the debtor to pay the amount due. To sue on them, a 
creditor merely declared that the debtor owed him a certain sum on a 
book account that he had never paid, "though often requested." Both 
parties could testify, and each was free to offer whatever evidence he 
or she thought relevant to the dispute. The book itself was not conclu-
12. The quantitative data in this paper rest on a sample of 5317 civil cases drawn from the 
records of the Hartford and New London county courts at five-year intervals from 1690 through 
1760. An earlier version of my findings on debt litigation, based on a much smaller sample, 
appeared as Mann, Rationality, Legal Change, and Community in Connecticut, 1690-1760, 14 
LAW & SocY. REV. 187 (1980). 
13. Actions on book accounts fell from 71 % of all debt litigation in the Hartford County 
Court in the first decade of the century to 29% in the third. In the 1730s, they reached 19%, at 
which level they remained until just before the Revolution. Actions on written instruments in-
creased from 15% in the first decade of the century to 68% in the third and 80% thereafter. 
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sive evidence of the debt. It was, instead, merely a starting point for 
discussing in open court the range of dealings between debtor and 
creditor. 
Notes and bonds, on the other hand, were a very different kind of 
debt obligation. They were formal instruments by which the debtor, 
over his own signature, expressly promised to pay a specific sum to the 
creditor, either on demand or on a certain date. 14 The debtor's liabil-
ity rested primarily on whether the instrument itself met the legal re-
quirements of form. Actions on written instruments did not admit the 
range of evidence that was permissible in actions on book accounts. 
The debtor's options in court were few. He could plead non estfactum 
- that the instrument was not his deed, either because it had been 
altered or because his signature had been forged. He could plead per-
formance of the condition if the bond was conditional or the note had 
been given to secure performance of a promise. Or he could plead 
payment. He could not plead that there had been a mistake or that he 
was entitled to a set-off from other dealings with the creditor or that 
he had intended something other than what he had signed or that the 
creditor had promised not to sue. In short, except for pleas that were 
limited in scope and often technical in nature, written instruments 
bound debtors to what they had signed. This quality made notes and 
bonds more definite and less controvertible than book accounts. With 
their precise forms and express promises, written obligations embodied 
the debtor's liability more completely and to a greater degree of cer-
tainty than book accounts. 
The formal differences between book accounts and written credit 
instruments were not, of course, a function of social or economic 
change. The considerations that led people to use one rather than the 
other, however, were. Until well into the eighteenth century, the ma-
jority of the population in Connecticut were farmers who produced 
primarily for their own households, with only small surpluses avail-
14. There were, of course, differences among the kinds of written instruments. Conditioned 
bonds, which were more common than single or simple bonds, were contracts under seal by 
which the obligor bound himself to pay the stipulated sum to the obligee on a certain date unless 
by that date he had performed a specified condition. That condition, known as the condition of 
defeasance, could be either the performance of some act or the payment of a sum of money. Bills 
obligatory and promissory notes were not under seal. They were promises signed by the debtor 
to pay the creditor a specified sum within a stipulated time or on demand. Bills generally ac-
knowledged the indebtedness and recited what we would now regard as the consideration for the 
debtor's promise, whereas notes were simply unadorned promises to pay the named amount. In 
Connecticut, bills obligatory were also signed by witnesses, while promissory notes were not. For 
the most part, the distinctions between bills obligatory and promissory notes in Connecticut were 
inconsequential, and relatively few identifiable bills appear in the records. It would be misleading 
to impute the contemporary English or modern clarity of the categories of bonds, bills, and notes 
to colonial practice. As a group, they stand in sharp contrast to book debts, and the similarities 
among them are far more important than the differences. 
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able for trade. Their failure to produce for the market stemmed not 
from lack of interest or aversion to commercial activity, but rather 
from conditions of land, labor, and transportation. Poor transporta-
tion, rocky soil, and the high cost of labor relative to the price of land 
hindered production of a commercial surplus and kept trade within 
well-worn local channels. The economy was "pre-commercial" of ne-
cessity, not by choice.15 Subsistence, however, is not the same as self-
sufficiency. For what farmers could not grow or make themselves, 
such as cooking utensils and fineries, they relied on local shopkeepers, 
merchants, and chapmen. Payment was rarely in cash, which was 
chronically scarce. Instead, people used agricultural produce as 
money. Book accounts facilitated such transactions, as well as trans-
actions with blacksmiths, coopers, carpenters, tanners, tavemers, 
mowers, drivers, laborers, and anyone else with whom one traded 
goods or services. They were a product as well as a record of face-to-
face transactions between traders and farmers, farmers and laborers, 
as well as of more distant transactions between traders and the 
merchants who supplied them. 
Creditors in such circumstances knew their debtors, and knew 
them well. Book accounts relied on a creditor's willingness to extend 
credit to people who did not expressly bind themselves to repay the 
debt, a willingness that implies a measure of trust between creditor 
and debtor. Trust could rest as easily on self-interest as on altruism. 
It might be that of friends or neighbors, or that of traders who formed 
assumptions and expectations of one another's behavior through a se-
ries of exchanges, or a combination of the two. The trust necessary to 
support dealings on book accounts did not require the parties to share 
the idealized indicia of community, yet it occurred most often among 
neighbors. Book debts were, to a large extent, community matters. 
Almost ninety percent of all book debt actions filed in the Hartford 
County Court in 1700 were between residents of the county, and in 
sixty percent both debtor and creditor lived in the same town. The 
local nexus of book debt was an important element of the intricate 
webs of multilayered social relations that characterized early commu-
nities. The smallness of society in seventeenth-century Connecticut 
meant that debtors and creditors did not, indeed could not, limit their 
relations to single transactions. 16 The debt was only one part of their 
15. See R. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO y ANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765, at 25-32 (1967); I. MITCHELL, ROADS AND ROAD-MAKING IN 
COLONIAL CONNECTICUT (1933) (Connecticut Tercentenary Commission pamphlet); Daniels, 
Economic Development in Colonial and Revolutionary Connecticut: An Overview, 31 WM. & 
MARY Q. (3d ser.) 429 (1980). 
16. The elements of community life in seventeenth-century New England are too numerous 
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dealings with one another within the community. In such circum-
stances, the procedural and evidentiary flexibility of book debt allowed 
the parties to present their dispute in ways that would place the legal 
issue of indebtedness in the larger context of their social relations, 
against which context the bench or jury would decide the case. Debt-
ors and creditors who recorded their dealings in book accounts com-
mitted themselves to a course that permitted a broad inquiry into the 
nature of their mutual obligations, an inquiry that was appropriate 
when the relations between them were not limited to the individual 
transactions that created the debt. 
Much of the way of doing business that underlay book debt 
changed with the advent of paper money, which was both a cause and 
a symptom of economic transformation in the early eighteenth cen-
, tury. The first issue of paper currency by the General Assembly in 
1709 signaled growing involvement in a commercial economy. I7 
Trade expanded rapidly in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Population, which had doubled in the generation between 1670 and 
1700, doubled again in the next thirty years. Population density, 
which had remained fairly stable for the twenty years before 1710, 
increased rapidly as the rate of population growth outstripped the 
availability of new land for settlement. Is The resulting pressure on 
land led to more specialized cultivation to adapt to different types of 
soil. Specialization in turn led to commercial farming because of the 
need to market crops and the development of large markets in the 
West Indies. I9 With more products available for export, secondary 
ports along the Connecticut River and Long Island Sound and market 
towns on the road to Boston grew to accommodate the demand for 
markets and transportation. The lure of greater local trading opportu-
nities encouraged men to enter the lists as small traders and challenge 
established merchants. Paper money allowed new traders to enter 
towns and compete with established merchants by offering farmers 
cash for their goods.20 It also answered the demands for capital of 
to discuss here. For descriptions, see the works cited in notes 3 & 8 supra, and the brief, pictur-
esque description in J. DEMOS, ENTERTAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFT AND THE CULTURE OF 
EARLY NEW ENGLAND 311-12 (1982). 
17. 5 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 111-12 (C. Hoadly ed. 
1870) [hereinafter cited as CoNN. REc.]; J. HENRETTA, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCI-
ETY, 1700-1815: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 7 (1973); see also J. PRICE, CAPITAL AND 
CREDIT IN BRlTISH OVERSEAS TRADE: THE VIEW FROM THE CHESAPEAKE, 1700-1776 (1980). 
18. B. DANIELS, THE CoNNECTICUTTOWN: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1635-1790, at 
47, 50 (1979). 
19. Daniels, supra note 15, at 433-34. 
20. R. BUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 107-21; J. HENRETTA, supra note 17, at 36-37, 78-81; 
MARTIN, MERCHANTS AND TRADE OF THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY, 1750-1820, at 14 
(1939) (Smith College Studies in History, xx1v). 
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farmers who wanted to buy or stock land and of traders who needed 
goods to trade. As paper currency supplanted commodity money, di-
rect extensions of credit in return for written promises to repay be-
came the dominant mode of contracting debt obligations. These 
promises were the bonds and promissory notes that pushed book debt 
aside in the 1720s. Even people who continued to trade on book felt 
the influence of signed credit instruments when creditors demanded 
that their debtors make their book accounts over into notes or bonds 
as a condition of further credit.21 
The formal rationality of written instruments made them better 
suited than book accounts to credit transactions in an expanding econ-
omy. The certainty with which they embodied the debtor's liability 
made the outcome oflitigation on them more predictable. Since noth-
ing mattered other than the piece of paper with the debtor's promise 
and signature, no other evidence was relevant or even admissible. The 
formal attributes of written credit instruments limited litigation 
largely to the instruments themselves, homogenizing the underlying 
transactions and giving them a uniform, predictable character. More-
over, written instruments, unlike book accounts, were assignable, a 
trait that facilitated commercial transactions at the same time that it 
depersonalized the relationship between debtor and creditor. Notes 
and bonds reflected a world of rather different relations between debt-
ors and creditors than those recorded on book. It was a world in 
which credit was no longer something that grew from transaction to 
transaction as people dealt with one another without formal promises 
to pay. Instead, credit had become something extended in single 
transactions in return for formal admissions ofliability. Relations that 
had once been neighborly courses of dealing now focused on individ-
ual transactions. 
The expansion of the economy in the eighteenth century did not 
mean that all commercial dealings became faceless and impersonal. 
However, population growth, migration, and economic development 
drew people beyond town and county boundaries and changed the way 
21. For example, when Simon Scripture, "a Shop keeper and Retailer of English Goods" in 
Coventry, insisted that James Jackson of Windsor acknowledge a book account that was larger 
than Jackson had anticipated and give him a note for it at a usurious rate of interest, Jackson felt 
he had no choice but to agree, "being then unable to pay said Debt and fearing the displeasure 
of" Scripture. Defendant's plea in bar (Jan. 1756), Scripture v. Jackson, 14 Hartford County 
Court Rec. 211, 237, Hartford County Court Files 150 (1755-56) (Conn. State Library, Hart-
ford). See generally R. BUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 127-30; Martin, supra note 20, at 156-63. 
Herbert A. Johnson noted a similar transformation in New York from a barter economy to one 
based on credit, and the resulting increased importance of credit instruments. H. JOHNSON, THE 
LAW MERCHANT AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK, 1664-1730, at 4-
14 (1963). 
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they did business with one another. Multilayered relations and the 
dealings appropriate to them did not disappear. The continued use of 
book accounts suggests that they persisted. But they now shared the 
stage with single-interest, instrumental relations that were shaped by 
new patterns of economic behavior. When written credit instruments 
first appeared in significant numbers in the second decade of the eight-
eenth century, nearly two-thirds of them linked debtors and creditors 
from different towns.22 Distance made the development of traditional 
multilayered relations unlikely. If book accounts implied a measure of 
trust between debtor and creditor, it was a trust made possible by the 
smallness of an economic universe in which people knew one another 
well and dealt with one another frequently. Notes and bonds, on the 
other hand, gave credit transactions an intrinsic certainty and predict-
ability that rested on legal form rather than on trust. Connecticut at 
midcentury was still a small society. Its inhabitants retained a com-
munitarian model of social life even while their commercial behavior 
became more impersonal.23 But the nature of their relations and the 
legal forms that embodied them were fundamentally different from 
those that had prevailed a generation or two earlier. 
Book accounts were an essentially community-based form of debt 
obligation. Because of their procedural and evidentiary flexibility, lia-
bility on them turned more on the facts of a dispute than on fixed 
conceptions of the law, as one debtor discovered when he complained 
- in vain - that the jury that decided a book debt action against him 
had considered evidence that the court had excluded. 24 The proce-
dural framework of book debt litigation rested on the assumption that 
each dispute was unique and therefore to be decided only after the 
parties had aired all the evidence they thought relevant. This doubt-
22. Of the actions on written instruments filed in the Hartford County Court between 1710 
and 1715, 64% involved debtors and creditors from different towns. As a methodological mat-
ter, one must, of course, exercise caution in extrapolating from litigation patterns to the behavior 
of debtors and creditors generally. With respect to actions on written instruments, there are 
some useful connections between the worlds of litigation and nonlitigated compliance. By the 
1730s, most actions on written instruments in the county courts did not represent disputes at all. 
Instead, they were uncontested actions in which the creditor filed suit and the debtor acknowl-
edged the indebtedness to facilitate later collection by the creditor if the debtor defaulted. See 
note 26 infra and accompanying text. As notes and bonds spread in intratown credit relations, 
one would expect to find an increase in the proportion of intratown actions on written instru-
ments and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of intertown actions on written instru-
ments, not because notes and bonds were becoming less suitable for long-distance transactions 
but because local debtors could more easily appear at the county court to confess judgment 
against themselves. That is precisely what happened. 
23. See J. CROWLEY, THIS SHEBA, SELF: THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EcONOMIC LIFE IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6 (1974); P. TRACY, JONATHAN EDWARDS, PASTOR: RELI-
GION AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NORTHAMPTON 92 (1980). 
24. Petition of James Poisson (May 10, 1711) 6 Conn. Archives, Private Controversies (1st 
ser.) 222 (Conn. State Library, Hartford); 5 CONN. REc., supra note 17, at 210. 
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less explains why so many book debt litigants submitted their cases to 
juries for decision rather than to the judges of the bench, and why the 
vast majority of contested book actions, whether decided by bench or 
jury, turned on factual issues rather than legal ones.25 Written credit 
instruments, on the other hand, so routinized credit relations that 
most actions on them were not disputes at all, but rather confessions 
of judgment to facilitate later collection.26 Liability turned so com-
pletely on legal form that factual considerations were irrelevant. 
Notes and bonds treated as fungible the credit relations that book ac-
counts presumed were unique. Their increasing dominance in in-
tratown credit transactions in the first half of the eighteenth century 
suggests not only the spread of instrumental credit relations within 
towns, but, more significantly, that people were treating their neigh-
bors as they did strangers, at least in terms of their credit relations.2' 
II 
The community significance of the shift in the way people struc-
tured their credit relations was reinforced by two related changes in 
the same period. Like the changes in debt litigation, the decline of the 
jury in civil litigation and the increasing technicality of pleadings point 
to a transformation from a legal system that assumed the uniqueness 
of individual disputes to one that subordinated individuality to com-
prehensiveness and predictability. Unlike the changes in debt litiga-
tion, however, the procedural changes did not proceed from economic 
developments. Rather, their significance for notions of community lay 
in the increasing constraints that a partially autonomous legal system 
could impose on how people litigated their disputes. 
25. Juries decided 52% of the contested book debt actions in the Hartford County Court 
between 1710 and 1715. Of those contested book actions, 81 % turned on factual issues. 
26. Beginning in the 1730s, when promissory notes first eclipsed bonds, debtors never con· 
tested more than 10% of the actions on written instruments entered against them. In fact, they 
rarely contested more than six percent. Instead, they appeared in court and confessed judgment 
against themselves, or they did not appear at all and allowed judgment to go against them by 
default. Either way, the debtor conceded liability to the creditor. All of the confessions of judg· 
ment and an indeterminate number of the defaults represented creditors reducing the debts to 
judgments before they had any intention of trying to collect from the debtor. When the notes 
later became due, there was no question of the debtor's liability - the judgments had already 
determined that. If a debtor did not pay, the creditor could procure a writ of execution on the 
judgment to seize the debtor's property. 
27. Actions on written instruments increased from eight percent of all intratown debt actions 
in the first decade of the century to 14% in the second, 69% in the third, and 84% in the fourth. 
The mere use of formal credit instruments did not, of course, mean that the underlying credit 
relations were necessarily impersonal. One finds in estate inventories numerous long-overdue 
notes from neighbors on which the decedent had never demanded payment, which suggests that 
"neighborly debts" continued to occupy a special place in relations between debtors and credi· 
tors. See D. KONIG, supra note 9, at 82-87. 
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The jury has long occupied a central position in the pantheon of 
common law mythology. The symbol of twelve respectable "men of 
the neighborhood," in the traditional phrase, applying their collective 
judgment, understanding, and empathy to the determination of ques-
tions of right and wrong is a powerful one, so powerful that it tran-
scends whatever the reality may be. That reality is difficult to 
recapture. 28 Juries had been used in civil actions from the beginning 
of settlement in Connecticut. They decided almost all civil cases from 
the creation of the county courts in 1665 through the end of the cen-
tury. In background, experience, and outlook, jurors were much like 
the litigants whose disputes they determined, and not very different 
from the judges who oversaw them. They applied the same standards 
in their deliberation~ that the litigants would apply in similar cases 
involving others. They decided cases on the basis of the evidence sub-
mitted to them, on their understanding of the law in a formal sense, 
and doubtless also on their sense of what the law ought to be.29 
Most litigants in the seventeenth century submitted their actions to 
the jury under the general issue, which was a categorical denial of 
everything the plaintiff had alleged. Juries heard evidence on a range 
of issues, often a veritable morass of contradictions from which they 
had to determine who had done what to whom and why, and what the 
legal consequences would be. 30 How jurors determined these matters 
was in part conditioned by their identity as people from similar com-
munities in a communal society. When given cases under the general 
issue, juries - because of the comparative weakness of formal con-
trols, because of their discretion, and because of the secrecy of their 
deliberations - filtered the evidence before them through the prisms 
of their own knowledge, experience, and beliefs, a process that Clifford 
Geertz has described as "the cultural contextualization of incident."31 
In so doing, jurors determined legal issues against a template of com-
munity norms and served a mediating function between law and soci-
28. Most historians have focused on the criminal jury. Two of the best studies are T. 
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL 
TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985); and Murrin, Magistrates, Sinners, and a Precarious Liberty: 
Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New England, in SAINTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: EssA YS 
ON EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 152 (D. Hall, J. Murrin & T. Tate eds. 1984). 
29. There is no indication that judges instructed juries on the Jaw to apply. William E. Nel-
son, who studied Massachusetts in a later period, thinks that jury charges in civil cases were 
infrequent. W. NELSON, supra note 11, at 26. 
30. W. NELSON, supra note 11, at 22-23, has a good discussion of the effect of pleading the 
general issue. 
31. C. GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Historical Perspective, in LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EsSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 181 (1983). 
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ety.32 In theory and in ideal, such a function is the principal purpose 
of the jury. Yet juries can perform their traditional role as purveyors 
of community norms only if they get cases to decide. It is thus signifi-
cant that, from early in the eighteenth century, most contested civil 
actions in Connecticut never reached a jury. Instead, judges disposed 
of them on points of law. By 1745, bench judgments concluded eighty 
percent of all contested civil actions in the Hartford County Court.33 
The decline of the jury is striking. Within the space of half a gen-
eration, the scales of civil justice tipped from a system based on ver-
dicts rendered by representatives of individual communities to one 
that rested on judgments delivered from the bench. The jury itself did 
not change in any fundamental way, but it became increasingly irrele-
vant to the resolution of private disputes. Not only did juries decide 
fewer cases, those they did decide often turned on limited issues or on 
special verdicts, neither of which involved a determination of liability 
by the jury. 
The immediate explanation for the decline lies in the marked 
change in the way litigants pleaded their cases during the first half of 
the eighteenth century. The general direction of the change was from 
pleas that raised factual issues to pleas that raised legal ones. Until 
shortly before 1710, virtually all contested civil actions in the county 
courts were tried under the general issue. Around 1710, though, 
pleadings took on a different aspect. Factual pleas still predominated, 
although not overwhelmingly - twenty-four percent of the defen-
dants pleaded the general issue and thirty-three percent pleaded in bar 
(that is, they made a counter-assertion of fact that, if true and iflegally 
sufficient, would have excused them from liability in whole or in part). 
For the first time, however, a substantial number of defendants offered 
dilatory pleas - thirty-eight percent pleaded in abatement by alleging 
some technical defect in the writ or in its service. Most of the techni-
cal pleas failed, and the people who made them retreated to pleading 
the merits of their case. Yet the fact that their first line of defense had 
been a legalistic objection that avoided the merits of the plaintiff's alle-
gations suggests a significant change in the way people approached 
litigation. Moreover, the formal appearance of pleas in bar, with their 
consequent narrowing of the issue to be tried, was a procedural refine-
ment in what had hitherto largely been unrestricted argument. 
32. This quality of juries is an important part of Nelson's argument. W. NELSON, supra note 
11, at 20-30. 
33. The subset of the sample described in note 12, supra, that consists of contested civil 
actions in the Hartford County Court contains 953 actions. I counted rulings that sustained 
pleas in abatement as bench judgments unless the plaintiff amended his writ or appealed the 
ruling, because such rulings effectively represented the end of the litigation. 
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The proportion of technical pleas rose quickly in the second de-
cade of the century. By 1720, pleadings on the merits had declined to 
a scant fifteen percent of the initial pleas in civil actions. By 1730 the 
patterns were clear, if somewhat variable. Defendants pleaded to the 
merits of the plaintiff's declaration roughly twenty to thirty percent of 
the time, pleading the general issue somewhat more often than they 
pleaded specially. The rest of the time, which is to say most of the 
time, they made pleas in which the legal issues were paramount and 
the facts were immaterial or admitted. By an increasing margin, most 
of those pleas were demurrers. 
The shift in the structure of pleadings in civil litigation could 
hardly have been sharper. In a legal system that made a formal, albeit 
often artificial, distinction between fact and law, a change from a mode 
of procedure that permitted litigants to have their disputes decided on 
the merits, whatever they might be, to one that reduced disputes to 
abstract principles of law represented a fundamental transformation of 
the role of law in adjudicating economic and social relations. The de-
cline of the jury, which was partly attributable to the growing predom-
inance of technical pleas, was one symptom of that transformation. 
The change in pleadings was another. 
The causes of the transformation were several. The first steps to-
ward greater formality in legal practice and procedure were the exten-
sive efforts of Sir Edmund Andros in the late 1680s to conform 
colonial court procedure to English practice. 34 Subsequent steps were 
a consequence of the protracted struggle between James Fitch and the 
Winthrop family for control of large tracts of land in eastern Connect-
icut. 35 The stakes in the dispute were largely political, but many of the 
skirmishes were fought in court, where Fitch's shrewdness as a legal 
tactician raised the level of pleadings in land actions generally. Proba-
bly the most significant factor in the transformation of legal proce-
dure, however, was the emergence of a group of professional lawyers 
at the beginning of the century.36 Their presence had a discernible 
34. David Konig noted a similar introduction of English practice under the Dominion in 
Massachusetts. D. KONIG, supra note 9, at 160-64. 
35. See R. BUSHMAN, supra note 15, at 83-103. 
36. The General Assembly recognized the growing practice of pleading on behalf of others 
and in 1708 ordered that no one should be allowed to plead for another person unless he had first 
been approved by the court and taken an oath that followed the form for attorneys given in the 
English Book of Oaths of 1649. The clerk of the court that administered the oath was to record 
the event, and the record would be proof of the taker's "admission as an atturney to the bar of 
the ... court." 5 CONN. REC., supra note 17, at 48; see also THE SUPERIOR COURT DIARY OF 
WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1772-1773, at liii n.1 (J. Farrell ed. 1942). Within a year, eleven 
men had been admitted to the bar of the Court of Assistants. 5 CONN. REC., supra note 17, at 48 
n.•. 
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effect on the conduct of lawsuits as they put their developing pleading 
skills to work. In turn, the spread of technical pleading made lawyers 
essential to litigation. By the 1730s, pleadings had become duels be-
tween opposing lawyers, and statutorily prescribed attorneys' fees 
were a standard item in the victor's bill of costs. Pleading not only 
now had rules, it had rules that were best understood by lawyers, a 
circumstance that allowed lawyers to arrogate control of pleading to 
themselves. When they did, civil litigation moved away from a com-
munal model, in which the disputants argued their grievances under 
the general issue, to a sparring match controlled by technical rules 
that made the facts of a dispute worth less than how one pleaded 
them. 
III 
The shift in debt instruments, the decline of the civil jury, and the 
growing technical sophistication of pleading were marks of an increas-
ingly formal legal system, one that was growing more rational in a 
Weberian sense. As cases came to tum less on the factual circum-
stances of each dispute and more on abstract and generalizable princi-
ples oflaw, local litigation became less distinctively "local." This was 
one element in the growth of a legalist paradigm in the eighteenth 
century. Another, perhaps more revealing, element lay in how the for-
mal legal system became the procedural standard for all forms of pri-
vate disputing. Two illustrations will suffice - the transformation of 
arbitration from "an amicable and neighbourly mode of settling per-
sonal controversies," as Zephaniah Swift described it,37 into a formal 
process that differed little from legal adjudication, and the increasing 
tendency of church disciplinary proceedings to adopt the language and 
procedures of the common law. 
Arbitration in Connecticut before 1700 was a consensual process.38 
No one compelled disputants to submit their differences to the judg-
ment of arbitrators, whose only authority came from the parties them-
selves and whose awards were legally unenforceable. Arbitration was 
also a community affair. Disputants and arbitrators alike tended to 
come from the same town. People chose arbitration over law when 
they knew one another and trusted each other to treat as final an 
award that had no legal effect. They also chose arbitration for its rela-
37. 2 z. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 7 (Windhnm, 
Conn. 1796). 
38. I have discussed arbitration in much greater detail elsewhere. See Mnnn, The Formaliza-
tion of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 
(1984). 
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tive speed, inexpensiveness, and informality. Arbitration was not liin-
ited by common law rules on joinder of issues, which meant that 
arbitrators were free to consider all questions and evidence that the 
parties chose to put before them. Arbitrators also had greater discre-
tion than common law judges did to fashion remedies to suit the griev-
ance. By submitting to arbitration, disputants expressed a willingness 
to compromise that was absent from litigation. They came to arbitra-
tion together, rather than as plaintiff and defendant, without the 
heightened sense of being adversaries that such labels iinply. 
These qualities made arbitration attractive in situations where the 
parties, for whatever reasons, had to be able to continue to deal with 
one another, as was the case in tightly knit communities where dis-
putes arose within a complex web of social relations rather than in 
isolation. The unenforceability of arbitration awards was of little mo-
ment. The cohesiveness of communities in the seventeenth century, 
fostered by the necessity of living together in a physical and spiritual 
wilderness, gave adequate assurance that parties would abide by the 
awards of the arbitrators they had chosen. Parties that did not trust 
one another would not submit to arbitration in the first place. Once 
they had, however, the party that openly repudiated the award risked 
the disapproval of the community. As long as community sanctions 
sufficed, arbitration awards did not have to be legally enforceable to be 
effective. 
Arbitration in seventeenth-century Connecticut was a uniquely 
community-based form of handling disputes, well suited to the needs 
of the communities it served. Communities, however, are not immuta-
ble. As we saw in the discussion of debt litigation, the social and eco-
nomic landscape began to change near the turn of the century. 
Population growth and migration weakened the cohesiveness of the 
early towns. Settlement dispersed. A commercial economy drew peo-
ple into market relations that increasingly crossed town boundaries. 
Towns became less insular. As the traditional bonds of community 
weakened, people who submitted their disputes to arbitration could 
not rely as readily on community support to assure voluntary compli-
ance with awards. In fact, arbitration was increasingly likely to 
involve people from different towns altogether. 39 The legal unenforce-
ability of arbitration awards, once of little consequence, now became 
troublesome. In response, disputants adopted various devices to se-
cure compliance, which in tiine changed the nature of arbitration it-
39. Whereas all arbitrations mentioned in petitions to the General Assembly before 1700 
involved disputants from the same town or the same family, in the next half century only 57% 
did. 
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self. The principal such devices were conditioned bonds and, later, 
promissory notes, which the parties would execute in each other's 
favor for penal amounts and exchange, in the case of bonds, or deposit 
with the arbitrators, in the case of notes. Each party's note or bond 
secured his promise to submit to arbitration and abide by the result. 
Although the notes and bonds did not give arbitration awards legal 
effect, as enforceable debt obligations they raised the cost of ignoring 
awards. 
The use of promissory notes had two far-reaching consequences. 
The first stemmed from the fact that physical custody of a note con-
ferred on the holder power to control the obligor's unconditioned 
promise to pay the face amount. Before the shift to promissory notes, 
arbitrators had only their social authority in the community to per-
suade disputants to accept their awards. As custodians of the notes, 
however, they now had a means of legal compulsion. They could re-
turn the notes to their makers or give both notes to the person in 
whose favor they had awarded. They could turn the loser's note over 
to the winner immediately, or, if they were of a mind to give him time 
to perform the award, they could wait. They could endorse the loser's 
note down to the amount of the award before delivering it to the win-
ner for collection, or they could deliver it unendorsed and let the 
victor sue for the full face amount. The power inherent in custody of 
the notes made arbitration a coercive process, at least in its end result. 
The second consequence was a change in the nature of arbitration 
awards themselves. Early awards had often resembled decrees in eq-
uity, with injunctions to perform or refrain from performing various 
acts. After the shift to promissory notes, which was largely complete 
by 1730, monetary awards predominated. Arbitrators began to cast 
their awards so that they could be satisfied by delivery of the loser's 
note, which was the one part of the process that arbitrators could con-
trol. Hence the shift to monetary awards, which partook more of 
damages awarded at law than of remedies tailored to the social cir-
cumstances of individual disputes. The growing predominance of 
monetary awards also indicated the declining community basis of arbi-
tration. The large proportion of arbitrations between people from dif-
ferent towns after 1700 reflected the geographic dispersal and 
consequent attenuation of the underlying social relations between dis-
putants. Disputes in such circumstances tended not to be played out 
against the background of a complex range of relations between the 
parties but instead focused rather narrowly on the individual transac-
tions in question. When the social relations of the parties had compre-
hended more than the dispute at hand, the omnibus awards of early 
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arbitration had offered compromise by their comprehensiveness and 
flexibility. The monetary awards of later arbitration were more appro-
priate for the more precisely defined disputes that arose from instru-
mental relations. 
The longstanding effort to secure compliance with arbitration 
awards culminated in 1753, when the Connecticut General Assembly 
extended contempt and execution process to arbitration awards.40 
Awards were now directly enforceable by legal process. The enhanced 
legal status of awards accelerated the changes that were already in 
motion. Arbitration, which had always been adjudicatory in nature, 
became downright legalistic. Arbitrators, more of whom were now jus-
tices of the peace, presided over proceedings that resembled formal 
hearings, with sworn testimony, maneuverings that mimicked plead-
ings, and lawyers acting as counsel for the disputants.41 The process 
itself was still called "arbitration," but it was no longer what that 
name had once implied. It had become, as Swift later observed, "a 
court created, constituted, and appointed by the parties. "42 
IV 
The formalization of arbitration resembled similar changes in 
church disciplinary proceedings, which, like arbitration, offered dispu-
tants a private alternative to litigation. The side of church disciplinary 
proceedings most relevant here is not the one that usually attracts his-
torical notice. Church authority in matters of morality, doctrine, and 
attendance, as well as instances of churches adjudicating questions of 
debt, contract, land title, business ethics, and other civil matters 
among members, are well known.43 For our purposes, the most perti-
nent aspect of church discipline is not its subject matter but its proce-
40. 10 CONN. REC., supra note 17, at 201-02. The statute was modeled on the English Arbi-
tration Act, 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 15 (1698). 
41. Using honorifics as a rough identifier, 40% of all arbitrations mentioned in petitions to 
the General Assembly after 1754 included one or more justices of the peace as arbitrators. For 
examples of the increasing legalism of arbitration proceedings, see Deposition of Timothy Swan 
& William Wheeler (Oct. 10, 1767), Minor v. Hewitt, 19 Conn. Arch., Private Controversies (2d 
ser.) 56, 64a (1768) (Conn. State Library, Hartford); Petition of Ezekiel Pierce (Apr. 15, 1771), 
Pierce v. Stuart, 22 Conn. Arch., Private Controversies (2d ser.) 18, 18b (1773) (Conn. State 
Library, Hartford); Petition of Samuel Minor (Oct. 7, 1765), Minor v. Minor & Minor, 19 Conn. 
Arch., Private Controversies (2d ser.) 55, 55c-55d (1765) (Conn. State Library, Hartford) (peti-
tioner had been "deprived of the council he had before retained whose circumstances could not 
admit of their then attending"); Petition of Seth Wales (May 29, 1770), Wales v. Smith, 29 Conn. 
Arch., Private Controversies (2d ser.) 80, 80c-80d (1771) (Conn. State Library, Hartford). 
42. 2 Z. SWIFT, supra note 37, at 7. 
43. W. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSA-
CHUSETTS, 1725-1825, at 26-34 (1981); E. OBERHOLZER, DELINQUENT SAINTS: DISCIPLINARY 
ACTION IN THE EARLY CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES OF MASSACHUSETTS 43-163, 186-215 
(1956). 
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dure, and in particular the increasing tendency in the eighteenth 
century toward a procedural framework and vocabulary that were 
self-consciously legalistic. 
Early Puritanism was an exceptionally legalistic theology. It de-
fined the fundamental relationship between God and the individual as 
a contractual one, embodied in the covenant of grace God had made 
with Abraham. Federal theologians of the early seventeenth century 
wrote of offer and acceptance, consideration, breach, performance, 
even of suing God for the promised salvation. For them, the language 
of law was a natural medium. It aided them in wrestling with the 
dilemma of how to make an inscrutable God scrutable, of how to 
render the mysterious workings of an omnipotent deity susceptible to 
comprehension by human reason.44 The legalism of covenant theol-
ogy had far-reaching consequences in seventeenth-century New Eng-
land, where the religious covenant between God and individual 
believers was the model for the social covenants that linked individuals 
in communities and communities to God. There were church cove-
nants and town covenants, each of which bound its subscribers in 
communities of mutual obligations, among which was the obligation 
of the community - however defined - to watch and correct the 
behavior of its members. Correction, however, could not be summary. 
Church disciplinary actions followed a common set of procedural 
rules that governed how churches should deal with delinquents.45 
The procedures were particularly notable in their distinction be-
tween public offenses and private offenses. The question of what 
things are public and what private is a vexing one that does not admit 
of clear or constant answer.46 In church disciplinary proceedings the 
distinction was double. On one level, the classification of an offense as 
public or private was determined by the number of witnesses to the 
act. On another, it was measured by the nature of the injury, which in 
turn rested at least in part on the substantive nature of the offense. 
Behavior that injured individuals rather than the community at large 
gave private, rather than public, offense. 
The classification of offenses as public or private was a matter of 
more than merely taxonomic interest. Much like the common law 
44. See Miller, The Marrow of Puritan Divinity, 32 PUBLICATIONS COLONIAL SocY. MASS. 
247 (1937). 
45. The best contemporary descriptions of church disciplinary procedure are T. HOOKER, A 
SURVEY OF THE SUMME OF CHURCH-DISCIPLINE (London 1648); c. MATHER, RATIO DIS-
CIPLINAE FRATRUM Nov-ANGLORUM: A FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCIPLINE PRO-
FESSED AND PRACTISED IN THE CHURCHES OF NEW ENGLAND (Boston 1726). 
46. The question continues to vex. See the papers from the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982). 
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writ system, the classification of the act determined the procedure to 
be used in redressing it. Persons aggrieved by private offenses had to 
follow the procedure directed in the eighteenth chapter of Matthew. 47 
They first had to meet privately with the offender "and seriously en-
deavor[ ] to bring him to Repentance."48 If the offender remained 
obstinate, the aggrieved person was supposed to redouble his efforts 
with the assistance of one or two fellow church members. Only when 
that failed was it proper for the injured party to complain to the minis-
ter, who would then deal with the offender privately, if he relented in 
his obstinacy, or with the assistance of the church, if he did not. Pro-
ceedings on public offenses, on the other hand, dispensed with prelimi-
nary attempts at private correction and instead began with an 
examination of the offender by the minister, usually with the assist-
ance of the elders. The examination served as a kind of probable cause 
hearing. If the delinquent maintained "that hardness of Heart, that 
bespeaks for him a publick Admonition,"49 or if the nature of the of-
fense required it, the pastor would refer the matter to the hearing and 
determination of the church, which would recommend admonition, 
censure, excommunication, or, occasionally, acquittal. 50 
The difference between the two procedures was not simply a mat-
ter of starting the disciplinary process at two different points. The 
requirement that disputants in private offenses deal with one another 
privately before complaining to the minister laid a conciliatory foun-
dation for the proceedings that distinguished them from the more in-
quisitorial procedures for public offenses. To be sure, conciliation 
often fell victim to obstinacy and recrimination, but the hope that pri-
vate dealing could forestall formal discipline was an article of faith in 
covenanted communities.51 
The undercurrent of conciliation is missing from later proceedings, 
47. See Matthew 18:15-17. 
48. C. MATHER, supra note 45, at 148. 
49. Id. at 144. 
SO. T. HOOKER, supra note 45, pt. 3, at 34-38; C. MATHER, supra note 45, at 144-46, 148-49. 
51. Churches not only inquired whether complainants had followed "the gospel rule" of 
Matthew 18:15-17, they also examined their substantive compliance with the scriptural injunc-
tion, much in the spirit of the maxim that one who seeks equity must first do equity. See, e.g., 1 
Voluntown and Sterling Congregational Church Records, 1723-1914, at 29 (Apr. 14, 1725) 
(Conn. State Library, Hartford) [hereinafter cited as Voluntown Church Records]. When pri-
vate dealing failed, churches still urged disputants to settle their differences themselves. See id. at 
34 (Mar. 21, May 2, 1726); 1 Middletown First Congregational Church Records,'1668-1871, at 
35 (Apr. 4, 1711) (Conn. State Library, Hartford). Perhaps the clearest affirmation of the value 
placed on conciliation through private dealing was the unanimous resolution of the Voluntown 
church in 1726 that a person who "does not take the scripture rule," yet who later settles his 
complaint after "occasioning the calling of a church meeting" and "finding he could not make 
his charge good," is "guilty of a scandal and that it is scandalous in the church not to censure 
such proceedings." 1 Voluntown Church Records, supra, at 27-28 (Jan. 1, 1725). 
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private as well as public. As early as the 1720s, but particularly from 
the 1740s, church disciplinary proceedings began to adopt the rhetoric 
and procedures of secular courts. There is no indication that they did 
so deliberately, although there is often a self-consciousness to the lan-
guage that gives one pause. For example, the records of a proceeding 
against a deacon of the church in Voluntown in 1725, who was ac-
cused of lying about a case that had recently been tried before a local 
justice of the peace, included a written complaint to the pastor, written 
interrogatories answered and signed by the deacon, two depositions in 
legal form, written pleadings by the accused attacking not the merits 
but the procedure of the complaint, and an issue "drawn up" for the 
church to determine "[a]fter hearing both parties."s2 The written 
complaint was probably not unusual, but the other documents do not 
appear in recorded disciplinary proceedings before 1725. Within a few 
years afterward, however, disputants used them often enough to make 
church disciplinary proceedings resemble civil trials in virtually every 
important respect - except, of course, that of the available remedies. 
Even the citations to appear before the church were nearly identical to 
civil writs of summons. They differed only in that they were signed by 
the minister rather than a justice of the peace, they appointed a church 
member rather than a constable to make service and return, and they 
were issued not in the name of the king but on rather different author-
ity, "in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ."SJ 
By the 1750s, churches had begun to address questions of proce-
dure explicitly rather than treating them as incidental to individual 
cases. The church in Kent voted in 1748 that disputants and their 
witnesses should withdraw "after the Publick hearing of the evidences 
and Pleas" while the church deliberated in private. s4 The first church 
in Plainfield and the fourth in Hartford each passed resolutions in the 
1750s which declared that no process could issue to begin disciplinary 
proceedings without a written complaint to the minister that specified 
the allegations and listed the witnesses who could substantiate them.ss 
Churches heard pleadings, including pleadings in the alternative, and 
entertained motions from alleged offenders that the proceedings be ad-
S2. 1 Voluntown Church Records, supra note Sl, at 28-30 (Apr. 14, 172S). 
S3. See, e.g., Norwich First Congregational Church Records, 1699-1917, citations and other 
papers in folder marked "Norwich, Conn. 1st Cong. Church. Church Discipline, 17S6, 1760-61, 
1766" (microfilm reel S8S, Conn. State Library, Hartford). 
S4. Kent Congregational Church Records, 1739-1823, at 27 (Sept. 1, 1748) (Conn. State 
Library, Hartford) [hereinafter cited as Kent Church Records]. 
SS. 1 Plainfield First Congregational Church Records, 1747-1899, at 18 (July S, 17S4) (Conn. 
State Library, Hartford); 1 West Hartford (orig. Hartford Fourth) Congregational Church 
Records, 1713-1924, at 168 (June 16, 17S8) (Conn. State Library, Hartford) [hereinafter cited as 
West Hartford Church Records]. 
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joumed to allow them time to prepare their defense or even to 
find legal counsel. 56 In church actions conducted under such rules, 
the procedure and rhetoric mimicked common law practice so closely 
that their references to "prayer" or "the church" are what seem 
anomalous. 
The growing legalism of church proceedings was a negation of the 
communalism that had infused earlier disciplinary actions. Although 
perhaps not up to the procedural standards implicit in Grant Gil-
more's description of hell as a place where "due process will be metic-
ulously observed,"57 the increasing procedural rigor of church 
hearings reflected a declining acceptance of the values that permitted 
such nonlegal hearings to function in the first place. The turn to 
greater procedural formality almost seems an attempt to compensate 
for a weakening consensus on the authority of church hearings by in-
voking the appearance of legal authority. It was, of course, merely the 
appearance. Yet the invocation of legal formality was natural. The 
language of law suits religion well. Both appeal to higher authority 
and speak through rituals that exclude the uninitiated except as sup-
plicants. As systems of authority, law and religion were no longer 
coequal in the eighteenth century, as they had been in the seventeenth. 
The formalization of ecclesiastical proceedings along legal lines was an 
implicit acknowledgment of that inequality. In adopting the vocabu-
lary and procedures of the civil law, church councils conceded the au-
thority and hegemony of the formal legal system by paying it the 
compliment of borrowing from it. 
v 
One cannot, of course, explain every legal development in social 
terms. The fit between law and society is always imperfect at best. 
Yet one sometimes finds convergences. The communal elements of 
law and disputing in the seventeenth century are unmistakable. 
Whether people pleaded their cases in court or submitted them to arbi-
tration, the forms and procedures they used did not place artificial 
restraints on their ability to air their grievances fully. As a result, one 
can read court records from the seventeenth century and "see" the 
56. Kent Church Records, supra note 54, at 17 (Oct. 2, 1741) (pleading in the alternative); 2 
Scotland (orig. Windham Third) Congregational Church Records, 1732-1915, at 49 (Oct. 21, 
1756) (Conn. State Library, Hartford) (adjournment "that [the accused] might have opportunity 
to get such council as he desired and which he could not then obtain"); 1 West Hartford Church 
Records, supra note 55, at 169 (July 25, 1757) (adjournment to prepare defense); 1 East Haddam 
First Congregational Church and Ecclesiastical Society Records, 1702-1927, at 115 (Jan. 4, 1774) 
(Conn. State Library, Hartford) (adjournment to prepare defense). 
57. G. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 111. 
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people whose disputes they recount. The breadth of relevant evidence 
in, for example, book debt actions or in actions submitted to the jury 
under the general issue allowed the parties to present their dispute in 
whatever context they thought necessary to a proper understanding of 
their differences. In insular communities, where social and economic 
relations were multilayered and undifferentiated, such flexible meth-
ods of disputing played an important social function in helping dispu-
tants reconcile their differences in ways that kept their disputes within 
the context of their communities and allowed them to resume their 
sometimes quarrelsome, but mutually dependent, neighborly 
relations. 58 
It does not require an idealized view of community to see the ap-
propriateness of such ways of disputing in traditional communities. 
Seventeenth-century New England was a small society. The world for 
most people was the town in which they lived. Social and economic 
relations, although hardly hermetic, rarely extended across town 
boundaries. For much of the population, that smallness was rein-
forced by the intense tribalism of early Puritanism. 59 For everyone, it 
was heightened by the exigencies of life in a hostile environment. The 
first settlers did not attempt to transplant the common law in all its 
rigorous glory. Instead, they fashioned an amalgam of common law, 
English local custom, biblical precedent, and adaptation to local con-
ditions, sometimes with an explicitly reforming intent. 60 They could 
have imported written credit instruments or technical pleading or ar-
bitration bonds, all of which were common in England, but they did · 
not. Instead, they adopted practices and procedures that treated indi-
vidual disputes as unique and took into account the community di-
mension of disputing - whether it lay in the background of trust that 
permitted arbitration or dealing on book accounts or in speaking 
through the jury or the church. The formal legal system, which was 
58. Although not proof of conditions in colonial Connecticut, the relationship between cvi· 
dentiary standards of relevance and the social context of disputing is a staple of the anthropologi-
cal literature. See M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF 
NORTHERN RHODESIA (2d ed. 1967); Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in 
Society, 8 LAW & SocY. REv. 217 (1973); Nader, Choices in Legal Procedure: Shia Moslem and 
Mexican Zapotec, 61 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 394 (1965). 
59. For discussions of the social and intellectual sides of Puritan tribalism, see E. MORGAN, 
THE PURITAN FAMILY: EssAYS ON RELIGION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH· 
CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1944); E. MORGAN, VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN 
IDEA (1963). 
60. The disparate sources oflaw in seventeenth-century New England have been well treated 
in D. ALLEN, IN ENGLISH WAYS: THE MOVEMENT OF SOCIETIES AND THE TRANSFERAL OF 
ENGLISH LoCAL LAW AND CuSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CEN· 
TURY (1981); G. Haskins, supra note 10. For a discussion of the connections with Puritan law 
reform efforts in England, see Warden, Law Reform in England and New England, 1620to1660, 
35 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 668 (1978). 
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not terribly formal, was as much a part of the communities it served as 
arbitration and church proceedings, the principal nonlegal alternatives 
to legal process. Disputing was a rather pluralist affair in terms of the 
procedural options that were available. Common law courts were not 
the only legitimate tribunals, and common law procedures were not 
the only legitimate rules. This is not to suggest that the alternatives 
were necessarily informal or offered substantively irrational khadi jus-
tice, only that their formality and legitimacy were not determined 
solely by reference to the legal system. 
Legal change in the eighteenth century tended in the direction of 
greater formalism. In the large area of debt litigation, the changes 
were closely tied to commercialization of the economy and the chang-
ing social context of economic relations. In the equally large area of 
pleading and procedure, the changes had a rather different impetus. 
The rapidly increasing technical sophistication of pleadings was ini-
tially spurred by the efforts of Sir Edmund Andros in the Dominion 
period to conform colonial practice to English procedure. It was 
brought to fruition, however, by lawyers who were first licensed in 
Connecticut in 1708 and who in the next decade furthered the proce-
dural anglicization of the legal system. 61 To be sure, the economic 
changes that produced the shifts in debt litigation also created oppor-
tunities for the skills of attorneys, but the procedural formalization of 
legal practice was largely an autonomous development that owed more 
to the professional tendency of lawyers to treat law as normative fact. 
Lawyers have the nasty habit of thinking like lawyers, which, as Alan 
Watson recently remarked, "inoculates them from too much concern 
with the demands of the society."62 Lawyers in Connecticut educated 
themselves by reading English law books. Not unnaturally, they ap-
plied their new learning to a legal system created under a royal charter 
that authorized "All manner ofwholsome and reasonable Lawes, Stat-
utes, Ordinances, Direcgons and Instrucgons, not contrary to the 
lawes of this Realme of England."63 
Although the procedural changes were largely autonomous devel-
61. John M. Murrin has discussed different elements of anglicization in Massachusetts. Mur-
rin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in 
COLONIAL AMERICA: EssAYS IN PoLmCS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 540 (S. Katz & J. Mur-
rin eds. 3d ed. 1983); J. Murrin, Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Pro-
vincial Massachusetts (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). 
62. A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 42 (1985). Watson also offers some trenchant 
examples oflawyers treating Jaw as normative fact regardless of social disuti!ity. See id. at 32-42. 
63. 2 CONN. REc., supra note 17, at 8 (J. Trumbull ed. 1852). Max Weber attributed even 
greater effect on legal development to legal education and the class demands of lawyers than he 
did to economic phenomena. 2 M. WEBER, EcONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTER-
PRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 775-76, 785-88 (G. Roth & c. Wittich eds. 1978). 
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opments of the legal system, their social impact was considerable. 
Technical pleadings, which defined issues in legal terms rather than 
factual ones, sharply limited the use and discretion of the jury. The 
change was not to everyone's liking, but the numbers indicate that 
juries declined in intratown civil actions as well as intertown ones. 64 
The changes in pleading and the use of juries, which were not primar-
ily social or economic in origin, dovetailed with the changes in debt 
litigation, which were, to transform the nature of local litigation. The 
social contexts of disputes became increasingly irrelevant, at least inso-
far as the formal legal system was concerned. The decline of the civil 
jury, the use of pleadings that framed generalizable legal issues rather 
than individualized factual ones, the spread of instruments that were 
adjudicated on formal rather than substantive criteria, and, above all, 
the appearance of these changes within communities as well as with-
out - all point to the conclusion that as communities changed and as 
law changed, not necessarily in tandem, the legal system became less 
responsive to individual communities. Conversely, the gains in cer-
tainty, predictability, and uniformity that accompanied the transfor-
mation allowed people from different communities to deal with one 
another within the common framework of an integrated legal system. 
The intellectual strength and coherence of that framework fostered 
the growth of a legalist paradigm in the eighteenth century. Changes 
in arbitration and church disciplinary procedure - two quintessen-
tially communal forms of disputing - demonstrated the growing he-
gemony of the formal legal system over the ways in which people 
resolved their differences. Law increasingly became the standard by 
which all forms of disputing were measured. 
All this is not to suggest that law became divorced from society, 
64. John Collins of Guilford, for example, was fined twenty shillings for contempt of court in 
1713 for his outburst in a tavern, after the judges of the superior court had denied him a jury. 
Although his plea had raised a question of technical law that was exclusively within the province 
of the bench to decide, Collins had, as he said later in his acknowledgment of fault, "thought it 
Law and Reason to have a jury," and was "very much Disappointed and my expectation wholly 
frustrated in not being allowed a tryall by a jury." R. v. Collins (Conn. Super. Ct.), 3 Court of 
Assistants Rec. 291, Superior Court Files box 323 (Conn. State Library, Hartford). 
The decline of the jury in Connecticut contrasts with William Nelson's assertions that few 
cases in Massachusetts before the Revolution were tried without a jury, and that juries were able 
to serve as important agents of community norms and fairness. W. NELSON, supra note 11, at 
20-30. Jurors can only perform those functions if they receive cases to decide. In Connecticut, it 
is quite clear that they did not and had not since the 1720s. There, the shirt that Nelson attrib-
uted to the Revolution in Massachusetts was complete long before the Revolution had begun. 
John Murrin has suggested to me that the difference between the two colonies on this point may 
in part have been the difference between a corporate colony and a royal colony. Juries may have 
persisted longer in Massachusetts out of suspicion of royally-appointed judges, a suspicion that 
no one in Connecticut, where judges were chosen by a popularly-elected assembly, had reason to 
share. 
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but rather that it became divorced from community. One might ar-
gue, although here is not the place to do so, that the development of a 
legalist paradigm, with its emphasis on generalizable, predictable rules 
rather than individualized inquiries, was an essential step in the devel-
opment of a revolutionary ideology that transcended particular com-
munities and united the several colonies into a new nation. 65 Whether 
it was or not, and I tend to think that it was, it is abundantly clear that 
the relationship between law and community at the middle of the 
eighteenth century was quite different from what it had been only two 
or three generations earlier. Law and community had both changed, 
and the once-close link between them had been broken. 
65. This seems to be related to what Edmund S. Morgan had in mind when he wrote that 
"[i]n 1740 America's leading intellectuals were clergymen and thought about theology; in 1790 
they were statesmen and thought about politics." Morgan, The American Revolution Considered 
As an Intellectual Movement, in PATHS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 11, 11 (A. Schlesinger & M. 
White eds. 1963). 
